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Abstract—Early-stage small and medium-sized enterprise 
(SME) cleantech innovation, if properly funded, can initiate 
disruptive low carbon reduction impacts across a wide range of 
sectors to meet Climate Change Net Zero requirements. The role 
of venture capital (VC) finance in successfully commercializing 
new technologies remains contentious, particularly where socio-
environmental returns may well be greater than the economic 
returns which are the exclusive captures of the investors. This 
paper addresses a pertinent question facing government 
policymakers; how best to support VC to achieve Climate Change 
objectives? It focuses on the supply-side policy, design and 
implementation of four UK government-backed venture capital 
funds (GVCFs) at various stages of their development. A systems 
framework and absorptive capacity learning lens informs a 
grounded qualitative methodology, spanning a decade of over 100 
in-depth interviews with policymakers, fund managers (private 
and public), alternative finance providers and low carbon finance 
market experts. A model is developed to assess GVCF learning 
evolution to address the nascent early-stage pre-
commercialization cleantech venture investment market. This 
avoids the pitfalls of quantitatively analyzing the investment 
outcomes of these long horizon investment funds prior to their 
completion, by providing qualitative process findings that inform 
policy, practice and theory in the evolving early-stage low carbon 
GVCFs.    
 
Index Terms— SME Finance, Government Venture Capital 
Funds, Cleantech, Early-stage Innovation, Green Finance, 
Entrepreneurial Finance, Climate Change.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
he required transition to a low carbon economy has come 
under increasingly sharp focus globally, particularly post 
the landmark Paris Agreement (2015) to restrict post-
industrialization global warming to below 2 degrees Celsius. 
Substantial investment will be required to facilitate this 
transition [1],[2], challenging the current capitalist investment 
markets and widespread governmental green growth policies 
[3],[4] and raising concerns that private sector investment into 
low carbon solutions will not take place quickly enough to 
achieve net zero carbon calls by 2050, or sooner [5],[2]. One 
major response has been for governments across the globe to 
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enact policies to increase environmental ‘impact’ investing. 
Understandably, their focus has predominantly been on large-
scale infrastructure work to improve clean energy, transport, 
heavy industry and agriculture (e.g. UK Green Investment Bank 
and Global Climate Partners Fund, see [5], [1]), the largest 
greenhouse gas emitting sectors [6]. However, far less attention 
has been given to funding the early-stage small and medium-
sized enterprise (SME) cleantech innovation which can make 
disruptive low carbon reduction impacts across a wide range of 
sectors. The role of venture capital (VC) finance in successfully 
commercializing new technologies remains contentious [7], [8], 
particularly where socio-environmental returns may be greater 
than the economic returns which are the exclusive captures of 
the investors [9]. This paper addresses a pertinent question now 
facing government policymakers [10]; how best to support VC 
to achieve Climate Change objectives? The paper focuses on 
the role of government-backed venture capital funds (GVCFs) 
and addresses Owen et al’s [1] call to learn and apply lessons 
from their past evaluation to improve the cleantech financing 
market. 
Advanced economies, notably in Europe and North America 
[11], where VC is more mature, have been at the forefront of 
cutting-edge new approaches to developing private low carbon 
impact investing [1]. Venture Capital (VC) represents pools of 
private finance raised by General Partner professional fund 
managers from private investor Limited Partners (e.g. 
institutional pension funds and family office investors). These 
typically form Limited Partnerships (LPs) as ten-year VC funds 
which the fund managers invest into early-stage potential high-
growth (PHG) ventures, typically spanning the high-risk but 
potentially high reward financing stages of seed (concept and 
research and development (R&D)), venture (start-up and early 
commercialization) and (commercial) scale-up, prior to 
investment exit, typically via trade sale or initial public offering 
(IPO) [12].  
Environmental impact investing is a recent phenomenon that 
has attracted VC investors. It incorporates socio-environmental 
aims alongside financial return [13]. A focus of such investment 
has been in cleantech ventures (‘cleantechs’), defined here as 
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undertaking environmentally friendly technological innovation 
and associated services and practices focusing on lowering 
carbon use and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions [14]. 
Cleantech is typically capital intensive, long horizon and highly 
uncertain, raising investor attractiveness issues [2], [15]. 
Investor pitfalls were starkly revealed in Gaddy et al.’s [14] 
reported collapse of the $25bn US cleantech VC market 2006-
11, which argued that VC provided the wrong model for longer 
horizon cleantech investment, being more suited to shorter 
horizon, digitech or later-stage investments [8]. VC is an 
industry of fashions, often attracted to shorter-term technology 
investment platforms, which appear stable, offer rapid portfolio 
company growth and quick exits, preferably in under five years. 
Recent decades have seen VC focus on internet and 
communications software investing, leading to the early 2000s 
Dotcom boom and bust [12] and more recent fixations, for 
example on smartphone Apps. However, whilst software 
dominates the VC ‘tech’ investment markets, longer-horizon 
(5-10 plus years to exit) life science and cleantech investments 
are also major segments [16]. Gaddy et al’s [14] study spanned 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the subsequent revival of 
cleantech VC investment in the US and globally [17], allied to 
the current complexities of the COVID-19 Pandemic [10], [18], 
suggest the need for further insight into the potential for more 
effective cleantech VC investing beyond the Pandemic [19].   
This paper focuses on the UK, a mature European VC market 
[2], [20], [21], perceived as a leading exponent of low carbon 
finance innovations [22], [23], notably through the recently 
established Green Finance Institute (2019). The paper examines 
the supply-side role of VC as a key pivotal private finance 
provider where public sector co-financing assistance through 
Government Venture Capital Funds (GVCFs) [24], [25], can 
make a difference. Lessons from the UK’s post-GFC GVCF 
market, from 2009 onwards [26], [8], are used to demonstrate 
how to create a more efficient financing escalator [27], [28], to 
assist early-stage cleantech ventures through the ‘valley of 
death’ from proof of concept to achieving secure market 
traction [29]. A systems framework [21], [30], [31], [32], [33], 
and absorptive capacity lens [34], [35], [36], is adopted to 
understand how GVCFs can achieve this objective. A systems 
and learning model is developed to qualitatively assess GVCF 
learning evolution for developing the nascent low carbon early-
stage pre-commercialization venture investment market. This 
avoids the pitfalls of quantitatively analyzing the investment 
outcomes of these long horizon investment funds before their 
completion [14], [2], by providing qualitative process findings 
that inform policy, practice and theory.          
II. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
A qualitative mixed methods [37] approach is adopted to 
investigate the supply-side delivery of GVCFs to address the 
patient capital requirements of early-stage UK cleantechs. First, 
the extant literature is reviewed to assess the cleantech early-
stage funding gap challenge and raison d’etre for GVCF 
instrument intervention. Second, Owen et al, [1], [2] call for 
cleantech GVCFs to learn from prior GVCF evolutionary 
lessons. This is addressed by establishing a conceptual systems 
framework [21], [30], [31], for applying an absorptive capacity 
lens [34], [35], [36] to analyze how policymakers and GVCF 
fund managers have learned, through their interactions within 
the entrepreneurial finance ecosystem [38], to enhance the 
design and implementation of GVCFs and improve the UK’s 
early stage cleantech financing escalator [27]. 
Since UK cleantech patient capital GVCF is nascent, 
operational only since 2009, the focus is on qualitative process 
analysis, avoiding quantitative data deficiencies on exit 
outcomes, unlikely to be realized yet [26]. The UK’s four main 
cleantech GVCF programs are examined: Investment 
Accelerator (IA); Low Carbon Investment Fund (LCIF); Clean 
Growth Fund (CGF); UK Innovation Investment Fund (UKIIF). 
GVCF information is drawn from 103 in-depth interviews, 
undertaken face-to-face, by telephone or video-link, with 
policymakers, fund managers, and stakeholders such as 
business support services, other investor groups and their trade 
associations (Table 1). The approach forms longitudinal and 
grounded case analysis [39] which, over a period extending up 
to 10 years, reveals layers of organizational learning [40] and 
also the process of interactions (or inactions) leading to change 
and realization of absorptive learning capacity [34], [35].   
Interview topic guides provided a consistently structured and 
flexible approach for exploratory qualitative data collection and 
analysis [39]. They profiled respondents’ experience and 
probed on the logic models and objectives of each GVCF 
program, their design, intended operation, ongoing evaluation 
findings and plans. A key focus of data collection, from 
multiple interviews over time (Table 1), was program lessons, 
using Theory of Change (ToC; [41]) and accompanying 
implementation logic models to evaluate the feedback loops 
leading to effective GVCF evolution. Interviews typically took 
1.5 hours and were transcribed, authenticated with participants, 
and triangulated between different stakeholder viewpoints and 
extant published evaluations and program management data to 
provide a robust evidence base [37].  
Grounded case evidence has subsequently been analysed in a 
unique way which acknowledges the contextual entrepreneurial 
finance (‘entfin’) ecosystem framework [21], [33], [30], in 
which (cleantech) GVCFs exist in the UK and the dynamic 
interactions, particularly between policymakers, fund managers 
and their portfolio companies, that lead to GVCF development. 
By adopting an absorptive capacity lens this interactional 
qualitative process analysis goes beyond VC organizational 
change studies investigating new market investment [42] and 
reverses the preoccupation with the flow of VC intangible 
knowledge into firm performance [43], [36]. Here, the emphasis 
is on the absorptive capacity of the policymakers and fund 
managers and the transition between potential and realized 
learning capabilities of the fund managers [34]).  
The findings from the study therefore have important 
ramifications for policymakers, set out in the discussion, since 
the primary logic driving the GVCFs [44], [21], is that these 
programs select and develop private VC with appropriate 
experience and skills to develop a sustainable early-stage 
cleantech finance market. In other words, the GVCF fund 




capabilities and are not constrained by external (notably policy) 
context, or their personal or organizational internal path 
dependency [45],[35].            
III. THE ROLE OF GVCF IN THE UK EARLY-STAGE 
CLEANTECH FINANCE MARKET 
Since first reported by the Macmillan Committee (1931, 
[46], recent studies [27], [47], [48], find a persistent financing 
gap for UK early-stage innovative potential high growth 
(PHG) SMEs (<250 employee ventures). This gap is most 
acute where information asymmetries (IAs) are greatest 
between potential investors and founder entrepreneurs, during 
early R&D stages through to the establishment of commercial 
market traction [49]. North et al., [27] find IAs are 
exacerbated for UK Technology Based Small Firms where 
early-stage ventures lack trading record and collateral to raise 
debt finance. Mazzucato and Semieniuk [29], find this ‘valley 
of death’ period [50; 227] particularly problematic for 
cleantechs due to their typically large, long horizon, 
investment needs for early-stage R&D, capital-intensive 
prototypes and demonstrators. Indeed, Owen et al., [51], [2], 
present examples of investments into renewable energy, 
advanced manufacturing and battery storage technologies 
ranging upwards of £15m and over periods in excess of 10 
years.   
Unsurprisingly, private finance, primarily motivated by 
maximizing returns from investments, assesses the high - risk, 
due diligence, and investment costs - and long periods for 
investment returns from cleantech as prohibitive [2]. 
Cleantech risk-reward balance is less attractive than other 
shorter horizon sectors (e.g. digital) or later stage innovation 
investments. Polzin [9], also highlights that environmental 
impact investors do not gain any direct financial benefits from 
the wider environmental external benefits of their investments 
(e.g. reduced air pollution and health treatment costs). Herein 
lies a criticism of the green growth policy paradigm 
exemplified by the UK’s Clean Growth Strategy (2017), 
which consistently overlooks the need for effective carbon 
accounting [3], [4]. Whilst beyond the focus of this paper, 
government policy and regulations form critical system 
facilitators (e.g. UK feeder tariffs encouraging renewable 
energy micro generation for the national grid), or barriers [52], 
[2], to investors in early market green innovation adoption [2], 
[38]. Notwithstanding, government co-financing of early-stage 
private VC alongside investor tax breaks, grants, soft/deferred 
loans or hybrid mezzanine finance (convertible loans), offer a 
potentially significant part of the solution to bridging the 
cleantech early-stage funding gap [1], [53], [54]. Venture 
Capital Trusts (VCTs) offer a potential option as investor tax 
break vehicles, but these private VCs have no specific 
cleantech remit and are typically later stage investors [55], 
suggesting targeted early-stage cleantech GVCF might offer a 
more effective approach to develop this investment market [2]. 
However, the role of GVCFs remains contentious, since 
government has to balance the cost of off-setting VC risk for 
public good, versus the opportunity costs of adopting other 
policies [29], [2].  
The UK SME equity investment market for seed, venture 
(early commercialization) and later commercial growth (scale-
TABLE I 
BREAKDOWN OF UK CLEANTECH VC ECOSYSTEM STAKEHOLDER 
INTERVIEWS 
FUND/INVESTOR/STAKEHOLDER LOCATION 
UK INNOVATION INVESTMENT FUND 
(UKIIF): 
11 INTERVIEWS: 2012 (8), 2014 (2) 2020(1) 
HERMES GPE ENVIRONMENTAL 
INNOVATION FUND 
EUROPEAN INVESTMENT FUND UK 
FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES FUNDS 
UNDERLYING FUNDS: 
ZOUK CLEANTECH II 




ADVENT LIFE SCIENCES 
GILDE HEALTHCARE III 
 
FUND OF FUNDS 
MANAGER, LONDON 
FUND OF FUNDS 
MANAGER, LUXEMBOURG 
HERMES FUND, LONDON 
HERMES FUND, GLASGOW 
AND LONDON 
HERMES FUND, LONDON 
EIF UKFTF FUND, 
LONDON AND CAMBRIDGE 
EIF UKFTF FUND, 
LONDON 
EIF UKFTF FUND, 
UTRECHT AND 
CAMBRIDGE USA 
INVESTMENT ACCELERATOR (IA) VCS: 
4 INTERVIEWS: 2018 (2), 2020 (2) 
MIDVEN (FORMERLY RAINBOW FUND) 





LOW CARB INVESTMENT FUND (LCIF) 
2 INTERVIEWS WITH UNIVERSITY OF EAST 
ANGLIA IN 2020 
 
NORWICH 
CLEAN GROWTH FUND (CGF) 
2 INTERVIEWS: 2017 (1), 2020 (1) 




OTHER GOVERNMENT BACKED 
INVESTORS: 
34 INTERVIEWS: 2014 (30), 2019 (4) 
8 ENTERPRISE CAPITAL FUND VC FUNDS 
MANAGERS 
19 ANGEL CO-INVESTMENT FUND LEAD 
BUSINESS ANGEL INVESTORS FROM 
INVESTMENT SYNDICATES, OF WHICH 16 
WERE SUCCESSFUL ACF APPLICANTS AND 
3 WERE UNSUCCESSFUL 
3 INVESTMENT COMMITTEE (IC) MEMBERS 
- EXPERIENCED ANGEL OR INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS 
4 REGIONAL INVESTMENT FUNDS IN 




4 LONDON, 2 CAMBRIDGE, 
1 OXFORD, 1 EAST 
MIDLANDS 
10 ANGEL GROUPS, 5 IN 
LONDON, 2 IN SOUTH 
EAST, 1 EAST MIDLANDS, 
1 SOUTH WEST ENGLAND 





2 NORTH AND 2 
MIDLANDS FUNDS 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND 
POLICYMAKERS 
10 INTERVIEWS: 2010 (2), 2014 (3),  
2018 (2), 2020 (3) 
BRITISH BUSINESS BANK 
UK DEPT. FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY AND 
INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY (BEIS) 
UK DEPT. FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND 
RURAL AFFAIRS (DEFRA) 
UK DEPT FOR CULTURE, MEDIA AND 
SPORT (DCMS) 
INNOVATE UK (IUK) 














ALTERNATIVE INVESTORS AND EXPERTS 
43 INTERVIEWS: 2014 (20), 2020 (20) 
13 ALTERNATIVE PRIVATE INVESTORS: 
PRIVATE VCS (4) AND SEED VCS (3), 
VENTURE CAPITAL TRUSTS (3) ANGEL 
CAPITAL GROUPS (3) 
 
30 INDUSTRY STAKEHOLDERS AND 
EXPERTS, INCLUDING:  
BRITISH VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION 
(BVCA), UK BUSINESS ANGELS 
ASSOCIATION (UKBAA), ANGEL NEWS, 
GREEN ANGEL SYNDICATE, ST JOHN’S 
INNOVATION CENTRE, OXFORD 
INNOVATION, PROFESSOR DYLAN JONES-
EVANS (FINANCE WALES REVIEWER), 
PROF COLIN MASON (ENTFIN ECOSYSTEM 
EXPERT, GLASGOW UNIVERSITY) 
 
 
8 IN LONDON, 2 
MIDLANDS,1 EAST OF 
ENGLAND, 1 NORTH OF 





10 REGIONAL ENGLISH 
GROWTH HUBS FOR 
BUSINESS SUPPORT IN 
LONDON, NORTH EAST, 
SOUTH EAST, MIDLANDS 









up) stages was valued at £8.5bn in 2019 (BBB, 2020). The 
market has grown rapidly in recent years, post-GFC bottoming 
out (Fig. 1), despite UK EU exit concerns since 2016. 
However, early indications in quarter one (Q1) 2020 suggest 
the COVID-19 Pandemic reduced investment by 38% 
compared to Q1 2019 with seed investment most subdued 
(BBB, 2020), mimicking VCs’ flight to later stage risk averse 
investing during the GFC [60]. Private VC provides the 
greatest share of SME market investments (43%), followed by 
equity crowdfunding (emerging rapidly from 2% in 2011 to 
25%) and announced business angel investing (22%). Angel 
and equity crowdfunding investments are more prominent in 
earlier-stage investing (50% of equity crowdfunding 
investments are seed stage). Whilst the UK seed market has 
developed an increasingly diverse mix of investors, including 
a proliferation of corporate-backed accelerators in London’s 
‘Tech City’, many early-stage investors, including specialist 
seed VC and angel syndicates lack the resources to follow-on 
fund [8], [21]. Equity crowdfunding also remains an unproven 
springboard for larger-scale funding, raising concerns over 
Series A funding gaps, particularly for longer horizon 
cleantech [2]. The British Business Bank (BBB) 2020 Equity 
Tracker [16], highlights important contextual characteristics of 
the UK equity market. First, the majority of investments are in 
the London-Oxbridge innovation triangle (almost half in 
London). Second, almost half of investments are in the 
technology sector (notably software and communications). 
Third, VC is predominately a later growth stage investor. 
Fourth, GVCFs support around one in six investments (Fig. 1), 
with BBB funds supporting 11% of deals, rising to 16% in the 
English Northern Powerhouse Regional Investment Fund 
(RIF) area and 19% in the Midlands Engine RIF area – much 
of it directed at earlier stage investing, with half invested in 
technology sectors. Software (£2bn) investments dominate the 
tech sector, with cleantech representing just £150m of 
investment in 2019. 
 
FIGURE I  




Note: Sourced from British Business Bank (BBB, 2020) Equity Tracker 
Report, Beauhurst data. Government proportional contribution proxy from 
announced/known equity deals, includes Devolved Nations (Scotland, Wales, 
Northern Ireland) European Union (EIF/ERDF), BBB Regional Investment 
Funds and Angel Co-Funds, but excludes unannounced ECF, UKIIF and later 
stage Patient Capital Fund investments.  
 
 
The UK cleantech market is nascent. Beauhurst’s UK 
cleantech market data exhibits almost £4bn invested in 731 
SME ventures with announced fundraising rounds since 2011, 
with some cleantechs evolving since the early 2000s (Fig. 2). 
Cleantech investing is demonstrably high-risk, expensive and 
long-term [44]. Only 12% of seed investments from before 
2011 had exit 
ed, whilst 35% had ceased trading. These cleantechs 
average 3 fundraising rounds with median funding 
requirements of £197k at seed, £750k at venture and £2.3m at 
growth stages. There was considerable evidence of angel, 
accelerator and government-funded investments at earlier 
stages, notably from regional and also university seed funds. 
Crucially, around 5% of cleantechs at all stages (Fig. 2) are 
classified as ‘zombies’ (inactive >1 year), suggesting they may 
be engaged in long funding searches. Since these ventures 
previously recorded formal external investment rounds, it is 
reasonable to assume that some remain viable and subject to a 
funding gap. Evidence from Owen et al., [2], [48], [51], 
supports this finding, noting subsequently funded GVCF 
cleantechs (e.g. Anesco and Petainer) have thrived, with a 
small proportion of stellar outliers generating substantial net 
new jobs, wealth and innovation spillovers, supporting the 
case for GVCFs [44], [26], [51].      
 
FIGURE 2 
UK CLEANTECH PROGRESS (%) BY 2020 BY FIRST FUNDING SEED ROUND 
YEAR COHORT (N=507) 
 
 
Note: 507 valid UK cleantech SME venture cases where current data on 
outcomes is provided by Beauhurst 
 
IV. GVCFS PROBLEM OR SOLUTION? THE IMPORTANCE OF 
QUALITATIVE SYSTEMS AND LEARNING 
Various commentators [44], [30], [7], [53], [56], [57], [58], 
[59], find that private VC funds are a well-established source 
of risk finance. VC fund managers, acting as expert financial 
intermediaries [44], [2], [57], have the ability to use their track 
records to raise substantial funds from large private 
institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, family offices) and 
use their expertise to invest in earlier stage PHG innovative 
ventures that operate in the space between smaller business 
angel and equity crowd funding seed investments (typically 

























(IPOs) on stock markets (typically >£10m; [60], [8]).  Zider 
[61], summarizes VCs’ role:  
“Venture capital fills the void between sources of funds for 
innovation (chiefly corporations, government bodies, and the 
entrepreneur’s friends and family) and traditional, lower-cost 
sources of capital available to ongoing concerns. Filling that 
void successfully requires the venture capital industry to 
provide a sufficient return on capital to attract private equity 
funds, attractive returns for its own participants, and sufficient 
upside potential to entrepreneurs to attract high-quality ideas 
that will generate high returns. Put simply, the challenge is to 
earn a consistently superior return on investments in 
inherently risky business ventures.” 
The problems for private VC arise where there is early 
staging, emerging sector and long horizon, capital intensive, 
investment [1], [2]. These factors coalesce to form a perfect 
storm of IAs leading to sub-optimal performance of the VC 
market, whereby funding gaps for viable PHGs occur [62], 
[63], [27]. A solution favored in more mature VC markets 
(e.g. Europe, North America and Oceania) has been GVCF 
instruments [44], [64]. Developments in GVCF in Europe 
since 2000 [24], [25], [20] and particularly in the UK after 
GFC adjustments [26], [51] are well documented. This period 
has seen the emergence of hybrid GVCF [24], [25], which co-
finance government and private VC and follow Lerner’s [44] 
advocacy that the private sector experts take the lead in 
selecting portfolio venture investments, with GVCFs nurturing 
then withdrawing once private VC is sustainable. 
GVCFs have been highly criticized for underperformance, 
particularly when compared to private VC investment exit 
returns (e.g. [7], [8], [21], [12], [28], [65], [66], [67], [68]). 
However, others [8], [26], argue that the older vintage of 
GVCFs required to analyze exit outcomes are outmoded 
program designs. Furthermore, there is often lack of 
appreciation for the different public good role of GVCFs 
which address socio-economic and environmental concerns 
and regional disparities [62], [63], [2], [69], [30]. This 
suggests a more qualitative approach is required to account for 
the policy role and design implementation context of GVCFs, 
within an appropriate system setting [21], [70], [71]. 
V. APPLYING SYSTEMS AND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY TO GVCF 
DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND LEARNING  
GVCF literature [71], [70], [24], [25], [57], [59], [72], [26], 
[8], [21] points to its catalytic role in delivering earlier stage 
venture private investment. Lerner [44] reviews more 
successful GVCF programs, finding the US Small Business 
Investment Company (SBIC) led the way in the late 1950s. 
More recent examples include Israel’s Yozma funds, 
Australia’s Innovation Investment Fund, the New Zealand 
Venture Investment Fund (NZVIF) and the UK Enterprise 
Capital Funds [26]. Kraemer-Eis et al., [73; 36) also commend 
EU European Investment Fund (EIF) first time VC assistance; 
“…many of the commercial VC firms being the pillar of 
Europe’s VC industry today would not be there without having 
been initiated by EIF.” However, Lerner [44] and Murray [25] 
caution VC is a long game taking decades to establish. Murray 
[25] also observes recent success is borne out of previous 
failures, suggesting organizational, absorptive learning 
capabilities [35], [40], by policymakers and VC fund managers 
has underpinned evolving GVCF hybridity. 
Murray [24] discusses emerging GVCF hybridity, 
distinguishing between those directly managed by government 
bureaucrats or, as Lerner [44] prefers, private VC fund 
manager-led via co-financing arrangements. Murray et al., [67] 
criticize directly managed GVCFs in Finland (e.g. Finnvera’s 
discontinued regional funds), whilst the infamous UK NAO 
(2009) [74] report scathingly criticized UK regional funds. 
These studies highlight design failures such as; poor (often 
public sector-led) management practices [75], overly inflated 
underwriting attractions to private sector fund managers 
resulting in moral hazard poor investment failures [25], small-
scale funds [72], [26], application to thin regional and sector 
markets [76], evergreen practices encouraging mission creep 
[67] and cherry-picking causing crowding out of private 
investment [77]. Collectively, these studies define current best 
practice GVCF design and operation. 
Drawing on Theory of Change (ToC; [41]) the rationale, 
design and implementation of GVCFs can be evaluated. This 
summarizes the GVCF strategy, delivery and intended benefits 
over time and can be formulated into a basic logic model [78], 
[79], addressing calls for policy learning through regular GVCF 
program evaluation [44], [1]. It also provides a basis for a wider, 
systems and learning, framework to address this paper’s 
requirements, set out below - addressing first the policy system 
and then the program design for GVCFs. 
 
The ‘Entfin’ System boundaries and networks for targeting 
funding gaps 
 
First, the strategic scope of the GVCF requires clear 
articulation. The instrument’s rationale is to target a funding 
gap. The four UK cleantech GVCFs (UKIIF, LCIF, IA, CGF) 
address a relatively small, but emerging strategically important 
market for tackling climate change. They do so through niche 
approaches designed to avoid program duplication and 
maximize private sector investment crowding in [77]. A 
concern from UK and European market experiences is to avoid 
thin markets [44], [76], for specific sector, stage and regional 
funds. An entrepreneurial finance (‘entfin’) systems approach 
[80], [81], [21], [44], requires understanding of the pipeline 
linkages between universities and R&D establishments into 
creating cleantech start-ups and public and private professional 
(e.g. accountants, lawyers) support services assisting 
investment readiness [82], [21]. In this sense the recently 
established BEIS CGF is designed to address cleantech Series 
A commercialization investment requirements, following-on 
earlier BEIS Engineer Entrepreneur’s Fund grants. UK regional 
funds historically suffer from a combination of local thin 
markets, poor management and design [74], [66]. The LCIF’s 
Eastern region focus is restrictive, but it benefits from close 
proximity and linkages to Cambridge University and its host 
University of East Anglia for R&D, alongside local science 
parks and expertise of St John’s Innovation Centre’s business 
support [38].   
Owen et al., [2], [38], highlight that UKIIF, established in 
2009, overcame the potential limitations of the UK cleantech 




public and private funds within its structure and actively 
seeking to syndicate with other international VCs. Syndication 
has multiple advantages of increasing investment scale, sharing 
risk and developing foreign market opportunities to enable 
scale-up [83], [84], [85]. It underpins the design of recent 
international GVCF collaborations such as between New 
Zealand and Taiwan and Israel and South Korea [21]. However, 
Murray [25] cautions that syndication carries potential pitfalls 
of diluted specialism and access to information and expertise in 
emerging technology markets. Cumming and Johan [57] also 
advocate investing across different stages to spread risk, since 
later stage investments where more data and market traction is 
known are typically less risky.  
The entfin system, policies and actors must be networked 
[44], [21]. The required top-down policy integration in the UK 
comes from the British Business Bank [86] and Green Finance 
Institute [23], to share learning, enable policy matching and 
avoid policy silos [2], [38]. Arguably, the Pandemic has 
demonstrated in ‘war-like’ conditions, that integration of rapid 
financing with sympathetic regulation can support early 
commercialization of impactful innovations. From the local and 
regional scale it should include suitable public and private 
ecosystem actors [38] to promote GVCFs to investors and 
cleantechs [38], [87], [88], develop support services [44] and 
develop effective finance escalators [27], [28]. Mason [28], 
argues for the strong presence of angel seed investors, which 
alongside other private investors such as accelerators, Venture 
Capital Trusts and crowdfunds (offering smaller-scale private 
investor tax relief), VC and later stage private equity, can offer 
a fluent advance to a suitably liquid exit market (typically 
through IPO and trade sales). Owen et al., [38] and British 
Business Bank (BBB) [88], further point to requirements for 
integrated public policy support to improve opportunities for 
regional levelling up [23].      
Since a crucial objective of GVCFs is to engage with the 
private sector to increase private investment and provide 
demonstration models for sustainable private VC in the targeted 
finance gaps [44], [51], network monitoring and outreach is 
vital to recruiting VC, who may come for example from 
emerging business angels, Corporate VCs or internationally 
[26], [89], [44].       
 
Program Design and delivery logic  
 
GVCF logic models set-out how each program will operate to 
meet objectives within their target funding market ecosystem 
[79], [78], establishing the inputs (funding), procedural causal 
links assumed to deliver, outputs and outcomes over a given 
period of time. Here the key GVCF best practice program 
design features are assessed.  
(i)Experienced private VC fund managers leading on 
investment decisions [44]. Whilst Murray [25], cautions that in 
practice GVCFs find it difficult to recruit top performing VC, 
Lerner [44] found the attraction of experienced US VC to 
Israel’s Yozma funds and New Zealand’s Venture Investment 
Fund helped establish VC in these markets, whilst Owen at al., 
[51] found that the UKIIF attracted high performing European 
cleantech VC and that the UK Enterprise Capital Funds (ECFs) 
had transformed business angels into VCs and spun out fund 
managers into the UK early stage VC market. Lerner’s [44] 
prescribed approach requires regular fund monitoring, but 
avoids government micro-managerial interference, allowing 
private fund manager experts to select and manage portfolio 
investments, add non-financial value (e.g. market, networking, 
management skills and recruitment), and focus on maximizing 
venture scale-up and exit value [43], [26], [51]. Lerner [44] 
advocates GVCF as a VC nurture and withdrawal mechanism, 
ending when private VCs are established, but in practice 
establishing early-stage private VC takes decades [51], [2].     
(ii)Designing VC incentives to attract private fund managers. 
Israel’s Yozma funds, which provided a model for the UK’s 
ECFs, offered preferential terms for private investors. The 
ECFs incentivize performance via an upside cap on state returns 
[26], whilst European state aid law has required that EIF GVCF 
investments operate pari passu [51]. In such cases, including 
UK Regional Investment Funds, better fund performance is 
rewarded by top-up funding [88]. Such approaches have been 
criticized [87], [88] as rewarding more rapid investments, rather 
than accounting for their quality or outcomes. 
(iii)Sufficient fund size and follow-on capability. A major 
critique of European GVCF is that they are too small [72], [26]. 
Arundale [85] reported European VC as half the size of their 
US counterparts, with US VC twice as likely to follow-on fund 
and better placed to spend time managing their portfolio, rather 
than search for funds. Murray [25] also points to established 
GPs with track records being more likely to obtain further LP 
funds. However, for emerging GP fund manager talent, 
supported by GVCFs, further LP fundraising after only five 
years of investing into longer horizon cleantechs appears less 
likely. Arundale [85] recommends individual funds should be 
at least £50m, but not exceed £300m. Lerner [44] and Arundale 
[85] caution that funds should not be too large to sufficiently 
manage their portfolios, which Markowitz [90] suggested are 
optimal at 30 ventures. Cumming and Johan [57] also highlight 
the importance of fund recycling, every 5-7 years, and ongoing 
government support to ensure that funds are renewed. It is 
worth clarifying that since VC investment is a long game, with 
the average investment being 5-7 years – and often longer for 
cleantechs [51], GVCF first funds are often fully invested by 
year 5 and typically require further support through another 
round of fundraising in order to continue to have funds for 
ongoing follow-on investment, as well as new venture 
investments to increase the size of the portfolio. Reviews of the 
ECFs [26] and LCIF [91] reveal concerns over insufficient 
follow-on funding, which often require multiple investments of 
£1m plus.   
(iv)GVCF program longevity. Debates persist over the merits 
of 10-year LP funds versus evergreen funds. Murray [25] 
argues that few evergreen funds have succeeded and Murray et 
al., [67] found that Finland’s regional Finnvera funds had 
suffered mission creep due in part to their evergreen design. 
Lerner [44], promotes LP funds as a stable internationally 
recognized and attractive legal format [92] providing suitable 
milestone incentives for proactive fund manager investments. 
A caveat is that funds require flexibility to extend beyond 10 
years to accommodate economic down cycles and longer 
horizon investments. Indeed, Baldock [26] and Owen et al., [51] 
found that the GFC had extended the average length of GVCF 




horizon UKIIF is a 12-year LP extendable to 15 years, 
acknowledging that cleantech VC is a long game [2], [51].  
(v)Fund structure varies considerably, with the UK in the 
vanguard of hybrid developments [24], [51]. Lerner [44], 
recommends private VC fund manager led co-financing 
structures which have been widely adopted. Variations may 
relate to state policies such as the EU requiring pari passu 
funding to comply with state aid rules [51]. Their simpler-to-
negotiate common share formats can facilitate easier match-
funding arrangements. Catalyst funds such as the UK’s 
Business Patient Capital, ECF Catalyst Fund, Angel Co-
investment Fund (ACF), Scottish Co-investment Fund (SCiF) 
and London Co-investment Fund are typically pari passu and 
designed either to top up new or existing private VC fund closes 
to increase their size and speed-up their market impact or, in the 
cases of the ACF and SCiF, to match fund accredited 
experienced business angel syndicate rounds [8]. Catalyst funds 
offer flexibility and fast response to private-led VC investment 
requirements, offering increased investment scale and speed to 
the market. Notably, Innovate UK’s Investment Accelerator is 
a novel hybrid fund which matches early seed grant allocation 
into cleantech infrastructure and health ventures with preferred 
supplier VCs, thus increasing early funding round scale and 
also encouraging earlier VC investment. Fund of funds, on the 
other hand, can leverage larger scale funding for multiple 
rounds, appearing particularly suited to longer horizon 
cleantech investment [51]. For example, UKIIF’s double layer 
of investment fundraising through umbrella funds and suites of 
specialist underlying funds were double the size of ECFs [51]. 
UKIIF attracted high performance VC fund managers from 
across Europe, due to the scale of funding and market access 
opportunities under the guidance of skilled umbrella Funds like 
Hermes [51], [2]. A potential downside is the double layer of 
administration fees and charges [93]. Conversely, suites of 
smaller-scale funds offering debt, equity, mezzanine and even 
grants across innovation stages have, if well integrated, led to 
effective smaller regional finance escalators, such as in the 
North East of England [87]. A problem for smaller regional 
funds is whether they can attract larger later stage venture and 
scale-up growth funds through inward investment.    
VI. APPLYING A SYSTEMS AND LEARNING APPROACH TO UK 
CLEANTECH GVCF   
Critical review of GVCF programes and ToC [41] policy 
consideration for the roles of the four Cleantech GVCF 
programes (UKIIF, LCIF, IA and CGF) within the boundaries 
of the UK entfin ecosystem reveals antecedent (pre programe) 
and programe absorptive capacity [35] learning lineage [25], 
[2], [51], particularly over the past two decades. This indicates 
that long horizon cleantech investment is nascent and GVCF 
programs operational since 2009 will not offer viable IRR and 
exit data [51]. The approach is therefore qualitative, exploring 
through multiple interviews longitudinally how each of the four 
cleantech GVCFs have evolved. This is achieved through a 
unique combined system and learning framework (Table 2) 
exploring policy system – relating to the requirement for a 
holistic approach [21] considering entfin ecosystem boundaries 
and actors and cleantech GVCF program design [21]. By 
additionally adopting an absorptive capacity learning lens [35] 
the findings are analyzed from the supply-side perspective to 
explore the learning processes and changes made by 
policymakers and VC fund managers. This addresses policy 
evaluation learning requirements [44], [2], by enabling greater 
understanding of the dynamic processes and actor interactions 
leading to potential or realized learning outcomes [34] and how 
this relates to best practice evolution for cleantech GVCFs.   
 
  TABLE 2 
A SYSTEMS AND LEARNING CONCEPTUAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
CLEANTECH GVCF 
 
System Element Dynamic Learning process 
and outcome 
 Progression from antecedent 
lessons applied by policymakers 
and VC to consideration of: (i) 
path dependency (ii) potential; 
(iii) realized learning 
Policy System (Policymakers, 
lobbyists and support agencies views) 
>Strategic policymakers 
(Departments, agencies) 
>Theory of Change (Defined role of 
GVCF Program) 
>Entfin actors (Actors involved for 
effective delivery) 
>Regulatory environment (VC LP 




Networks and linkages 
developed over time, key actors 
and extent of learning outcomes 
as potential or realized as best 
practice 
 
Program Design (Program manager, 
VC, trade association, market experts 
and *actors views) 
>Logic model implementation 
(intended and actual) 
>Private VC and incentives 
>Fund size and follow-on function 




Public program and private 
VC relationships, wider entfin 
market networks and linkages, 
relationships with portfolio 
cleantechs and extent of 
learning outcomes as potential, 
or realized as best practice 
 
*Note: market actors include treated and untreated cleantechs (details 
excluded from this analysis) 
 
VII. POLICY SYSTEM FINDINGS  
The nascent, niche nature of the UK cleantech market is 
highlighted by less than £300m UK government investment in 
the four cleantech GVCFs over the past decade into a growing 
market of almost £4bn [38]. From the policy system perspective 
each fund’s ToC indicates their distinct UK entfin market 
objectives (Table 3). UKIIF and CGF are venture funds, whilst 
LCIF and IA are earlier stage seed funds. However, their 
common aims build on antecedent hybrid GVCF policy 
learning [24], [25], including; “to leverage private finance into 
earlier stages of the UK cleantech market through de-risking co-
financing approaches” and “to improve VC investment skills 
and provide sustainable examples for the private sector to 
follow”, thus supporting Lerner’s [44] proposed GVCF nurture 
and withdrawal role.  
 
(insert Table 3 – probably full page spread) 
 
Individual Cleantech GVCF Theory of Change (ToC) 
 
UKIIF (established 2009) was described by program 




A to scale-up later stage fund, designed to have sufficient size 
to attract high quality European private VC and their 
institutional backers and offer multiple funding rounds to 
deliver substantive low carbon businesses.” Early evaluation in 
2012 revealed slow establishment of underlying VC funds and 
considerable costs associated with the private-led fund of funds 
approach. However, UKIIF demonstrably delivered catalytic 
high private leverage fundraising impact, post GFC, and GVCF 
fund sizes previously unseen in Europe. An EIF policymaker 
commented in 2020 “we have seen the [subsequent] success.” 
CGF’s first close (2020) represents the UK Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s (BEIS) first Series 
A Cleantech fund since establishing the now fully invested 
UKIIF. CGF is more narrowly focused (than UKIIF), investing 
only in UK cleantech, focusing on renewable energy and energy 
efficiency sectors. BEIS policymakers describe the fund as 
“…designed to provide significant VC funding for cleantech 
commercialization, including supporting BEIS Energy 
Entrepreneur’s Fund earlier stage grant funded cleantechs to 
realize their potential.” This new fund, drawing on the skills of 
the appointed experienced cleantech seed VC has installed 
rigorous cleantech selection criteria, hitherto only loosely 
applied to UK GVCFs [38].  
LCIF was established in 2009 as a seed to Series A fund. EU 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) support 
required a narrow East of England remit and socio-economic 
aims to assist women entrepreneurs, create jobs and raise skills. 
Situated in the A11 corridor linking the host University of East 
Anglia in Norwich with Cambridge University, the fund aimed 
to assist low carbon academic spin-outs and early-stage 
ventures attracted to local science parks. Designed as an 
evergreen revolving fund, tasked with potentially constraining 
thin market social objectives, it has had to widen its sectoral 
coverage and develop a nuanced, pioneering approach to 
cleantech investment selection. The Innovate UK (IUK) 
Investment Accelerator (IA), piloted in 2017, aimed to increase 
VC early-stage seed funding at post proof of concept grant 
funded stages. It aimed to place its successful grant funded 
ventures on a first step of private VC by co-financing grants 
with preferred supplier seed VCs operating in low carbon 
infrastructure and health sectors. IA’s program managers 
sought “to de-risk and raise seed VC investing and skills and 
certificate potential high growth cleantech and health ventures, 
advancing through their technology readiness levels, for 
follow-on investment.” IA’s early evaluation revealed lack of 
regional attraction, outside of England’s London-Oxbridge 
innovation triangle, leading to extension of the program to 
include accredited regional business angel network investors.          
 
Regulations and Support Systems Linkages 
 
The experiences of the UK cleantech GVCFs demonstrate the 
need for a GVCF entfin system policy approach with regular 
fund appraisal [44]. Cleantech markets are emergent and 
dynamic. Niche defined GVCFs require carefully designed 
holistic support, particularly to create a pipeline of PHG 
cleantech investible ventures through incubation and 
investment readiness support [80]. Stakeholders explained that 
regional funds, like LCIF, require local university and R&D 
establishment spin-outs, incubator and support agencies such as 
St John’s Innovation Centre, Allia incubator and Cambridge 
Cleantech’s finance and supply-chain linkages (agencies also 
supported by EU and UK government programs), alongside an 
established angel seed investment network and specialist 
private business support services in cleantech investment 
accounts and law. However, it is a salient lesson that even 
within an established innovation region, the LCIF struggled to 
meet objectives and required policy adjustment. Notably, IUK’s 
national IA GVCF also failed to attract low carbon 
infrastructure ventures from outside of the London-Oxbridge 
innovation triangle, with one Southern region VC respondent 
stating “IA encouraged us to invest earlier and into new sectors 
such as transport because the opportunity was local.” Early 
evaluation findings thus led to seed investor linkages being 
established in other regions.  
Multiple interviews (between 2012-2020) with UKIIF VC 
(including 7 case study ventures) revealed some stellar early 
exits (e.g. Anesco and Petainer), but also regulatory barriers. 
These were expected in bioscience, but regulations preventing 
small cleantech penetration into electronics and construction 
sectors “…suggest that government could do more to support 
cleantech adoption.” Conversely, some ventures had flourished 
in more conducive markets such as renewable energy when UK 
feeder tariffs subsidized market innovation and take-up.   
Overall, entfin ecosystem policy requires overarching 
program oversight [44], [86], [21], [2], to ensure that cleantech 
GVCFs are correctly designed and supported. Interviews with 
various government departments and agencies demonstrate lack 
of policy cohesion and sharing of lessons. Indeed, interviews 
sometimes “Informed policy teams” and “…led to sharing of 
internal reports and experience.” Major concerns remain that 
the British Business Bank has since establishment in 2013 
employed the most experienced UK GVCF policy staff for 
design, delivery oversight and evaluation of mainstream PHG 
venture supporting equity funds (i.e. the flagship circa £1bn 
Enterprise Capital Funds), but appears to show no interest in 
delivering new cleantech funds, or assisting BEIS or IUK to do 
so. This is a problem because these UK government 
departments and agencies experience high turnover of staff and 
appear to suffer from a lack of organizational learning and 
memory [35], exacerbated by policy silo practices. A challenge 
for the recently formed Green Finance Institute (2019) is to 
develop cohesive policy where programs challenge prevailing 
private market forces which reinforce support and investment 
into UK higher innovation regions and shorter horizon 
investments [25], [2]. For example, the British Business Bank’s 
Regional Investment Funds have found “Having a strong local 
network of business support hubs catalysed through other 
government department funded programs can be a vital source 
of potential high growth firm investment readiness and 
referral… but the quality and range of these services is patchy.”  
Finally, stable financial markets with internationally 
acknowledged legal structures for VC facilitate foreign 
investment [44], [92], [51]. This is demonstrated by UKIIF’s 
LP structure, designed to facilitate European VC collaboration. 
LP structures are attractive to limited partner fund investors as 
they establish a timeline for investment returns. Contrastingly, 
LCIF’s evergreen structure was designed as a regional seed 
fund, in expectation of leveraging at least 50% of funding 




matching through venture investment rounds has proven 
problematic for niche funds (e.g. UK Aspire Fund for women 
entrepreneurs). Collectively, national policymakers appear to 
have learned that matched funding should take place either in 
an LP structure in fund formation, or as a top-up for accredited 
investors bringing deals to the fund (which is possible for IA 
deals). This latter point links into GVCF program design.  
 
VIII. PROGRAM DESIGN  
Private sector role 
 
Following Lerner’s [44] principles, all four cleantech GVCFs 
are led by private VC fund managers with expertise in cleantech 
and earlier stage investing who select portfolio company 
investments and oversee their development. They utilizing 
private fund manager expertise, with minimal public sector 
oversight and monitoring intervention. However, different 
GVCF operations demonstrate their evolving hybridity [25] 
designed to accommodate different policy objectives and target 
actors. UKIIF’s private-led Hermes Environmental Innovation 
Fund provides experienced and well networked fund managers 
who assess and make investments into underlying VC funds. 
Underlying fund managers reported UKIIF as; “…enabling 
more rapid fund close and increasing the scale of funds…” 
whilst also offering “…expertise and networking support… and 
certification” to a wide range of VC, private equity and 
institutional investors. UKIIF enabled funds to deliver the 
desired volume and scale of cleantech investments in the £500k 
to £5m range to ensure optimal diversity and spread of risk for 
portfolio companies [93; 22-23). In contrast, IA and LCIF 
operate as partnerships with public bodies, but with the private 
sector selecting and supporting the portfolio investments. This 
partnership reflects the earlier stage investment process (seed to 
Series A) and requirement for IA to match Innovate UK’s peer 
reviewed grant applications with preferred private VC and 
angel syndicate investors and the University of East Anglia’s 
desire for LCIF to meet university spin-out requirements by 
utilizing commercial investment acumen supplied by 
Turquoise, a cleantech specialist investment bank [91].  
The fund designs offer other VC inducements. For example, 
IA seeks to encourage earlier stage seed investing by offering 
an enhanced promotion and application process for cleantech, 
providing a first stage of due diligence and technical 
certification via peer review, whilst LCIF offers the 
management and cleantech support skills of university R&D to 
provide a pipeline of innovative venture incubation and 
ongoing technical support. Interviewed VC were attracted to IA 
as “…it promised a pipeline of good quality investment ready 
opportunities”, but queried the technical peer review merit 
which “…frequently lacked commercial acumen.” Innovate 
UK’s longstanding, potentially path dependent, peer review for 
SMART innovation grants should be as credible as Germany’s 
Fraunhofer Society. In the UK reviews should come from 
government established specialist technology Catapult centers 
and universities with industry experience, including emerging 
Innovation Knowledge Centre programs (e.g. Swansea 
University’s energy technology IKC). While this remains a 
potential learning, LCIF exhibits realized learning through the 
university of East Anglia’s development of market leading 
cleantech investment selection diagnostics [38]. 
UK government programs (notably UKIIF and IA) seek early-
stage investor upskilling and demonstration to attract further 
private investors [44]. Underlying funds reported that UKIIF’s 
Hermes umbrella fund offered cleantech market expertise, 
particularly in “…upskilling fund managers, enhancing 
networks for recruiting executives for portfolio companies, 
developing international market contacts and VC syndication.” 
A major attraction of IA’s two-thirds matching grant allocation 
was the ability to raise £150k of cleantech early seed finance 
whilst only requiring £50k of VC funding. In principle this 
required minimal due diligence beyond grant peer review 
certification, enabling increased numbers of rapid small 
investments without an investment committee selection 
process. This follows fund manager-led US West Coast seed 
investing approaches [85]; also exemplified by Passion Capital, 
a UK government-backed London ‘Tech City’ seed investor 
[26]. Program monitoring [88], [91], [2] demonstrates 
collective VC fund manager and government agency learning 
[35]. For example, IA seed VCs stated “…we invested in earlier 
stages and new sectors … learned quickly, for example what 
£150k investment could achieve and whether this generated 
sufficient data to reduce risk sufficiently for further 
investment.” Early evaluation resulted in rapid program change 
to support follow-on funding to optimize opportunities to create 
a more fluent financing escalator for viable PHG ventures [28].  
 
Fund Size and follow-on scale 
 
Fund sizes vary considerably, reflecting target investment 
stages. Historically, small-scale specialist seed funds predicated 
upon finding follow-on investors have a poor track record [74]. 
Seed funds are vulnerable to share crushing by later stage VC’s 
poor valuations and deal arrangements and missing steps in the 
finance escalator [51]. To avoid pitfalls of slow, drip-feed 
investment, funds must either be larger to invest through to exit 
(the ‘Unicorn’ model), or have well-established syndicating 
networks [85].  
LCIF, a specialist East of England regional fund for seed and 
Series A investing, is smallest. LCIF’s [91; p10-11] review 
mentions two decent exits but also highlights concerns in 
raising follow-on Series A funding: “Opportunities for further 
impact could readily be missed if sufficient funds are not 
available at the right time. Every effort is needed to secure 
additional funds for LCIF, in order to further develop the 
Fund’s impact and reputation.” The evaluation corroborates 
prior UK regional fund shortcomings [74], revealing thin 
regional and sectoral markets. A fund stakeholder explained 
how fund learning led to a “…revised expanded creative sector 
remit to meet ERDF low carbon women-led business 
investments.” Nevertheless, more learning was required; 
ERDF’s private investor 50% match-funding threshold 
generated high private investment leverage but restricted 
funding opportunities. This was alleviated through earlier stage 
investing, but then led to a Series A funding gap being 
addressed by a further £10.9m of ERDF investment in 2019.  
IA began as a £50m pilot program matching Innovate UK 
grants with VC. Early IA evaluation [38], demonstrated that it 




on private investment. Participating VCs mentioned that 
“…insufficient data was being generated from initial seed 
rounds to encourage follow-on funding … despite their help 
with developing presentation pitchdecks and accessing investor 
networks.” IA was subsequently enlarged to £75m with 
provision for flexibly timed applications for larger, later stage 
grant and VC matched funding.  
In contrasting scale, UKIIF acting as a top-up fund, mainly 
for Series A and scale-up cleantech VC fundraising first and 
second closes, has been able to invest into underlying funds 
with an average first close size of over £60m [51]. These funds, 
such as Scottish Equity Partners and Zouk Capital (cleantech 
VC) can make substantial initial portfolio company 
investments, often above £2m, and follow-on fund without EU 
state aid restrictions. A further benefit is UKIIF umbrella fund’s 
performance monitoring and ability to make discretionary top 
up investments to facilitate fund recycling. 
Fund recycling, every 5-7 years, is crucial in allowing VC 
funds to grow and continue to follow-on fund their most 
promising portfolio companies through to optimal exit [57], 
[26]. The GVCF fund managers and stakeholders report that 
earlier stage cleantech investment is a long game [44], 
consistently expecting “…optimal exits to take 7-12 years.”  
These GVCFs demonstrate absorptive learning capacity via 
increasing flexible market adaptation by regular 2-3 yearly 
evaluations to assess requirements for follow-on funding and 
adapting policy to facilitate this, as exemplified by IA and 
CGF’s design aim to continue to seek further, regular fund 
closes and work towards a more optimal £100m size. 
 
Fund Structure and Finance System Linkages 
 
The different structures of the UK GVCFs relate to their aims 
to engage with different segments of the early-stage investing 
markets. They are designed by different agencies to tackle 
market niches, but operate in isolation from each other. Internal 
learning is evident from monitoring and program adjustments 
and there is evidence of institutional learning across the British 
Business Banks GVCF programs, leading for example to the 
enhanced size and scale of the flagship Enterprise Capital Funds 
program [26]. Discussions with policy staff offer no clear 
evidence of interdepartmental, cross-agency learning. Whilst a 
wide-ranging primary evidence (from policymakers, VCs, 
stakeholders) and studies [8], [21], [26], show little duplication, 
more concerningly [2], [38], there is little overarching policy 
attention to how these GVCFs integrate to complement and 
catalyze each other in the finance escalator [27].  
UK GVCFs tend to have 10-year Limited Partner (LP) status, 
complying with Lerner’s [44] preferred model which provides 
flexible timeline structures and milestones for funds, so that 
two-year extensions can be negotiated during economic 
downturns and to accommodate portfolio companies taking 
longer to mature for optimal exit. UKIIF, has an extended LP 
timeline of 12-15 years, acknowledging UKIIF’s investing into 
capital intensive long horizon cleantech innovation companies 
[93]. Further notable differences are that LCIF and CGF are 
single purpose GVCFs operated by a single cleantech specialist 
private VC (i.e. Turquoise and Carbon Limiting Technologies), 
whereas IA and UKIIF are more directly concerned with 
engaging and upskilling a wider range of investors. IA aims to 
develop a model of match grants with seed VCs and accredited 
regional angel network business angel syndicates, and UKIIF’s 
fund of funds investment model aims to develop specialist 
cleantech sector VCs across Europe. 
A potential problem raised by Owen et al., [2], [38], is that 
these cleantech GVCFs and other UK GVCFs (mainly operated 
as sector agnostic by the British Business Bank), do not relate 
or refer to each other. As Murray [25] indicates, there are 
potentially conflicting public and private investment tensions. 
First, private VC are in competition to perform well and there 
may be a reluctance to refer, although recent evidence from 
Arundale [85] suggests that UK and European VC are now 
more closely following their US counterparts and syndicating 
and referring more often between VC and other types of 
investors (e.g. angel investors [51]). Second, government does 
not want to encourage state dependency, putting emphasis on 
follow-on funding leveraged from private investors. There is a 
suggestion, explored in the next section that more should be 
done to integrate GVCFs into the wider support and investment 
network in the UK [88], [38]. 
 
IX. SYSTEMS LEARNING  
 
Applying an absorptive capacity, dynamic learning lens [35], 
[34], the findings offer insights into three types of learning – 
antecedent, potential and realized - and the pitfalls of path 
dependency and non-learning (Table 3). 
Antecedent learning has taken place across the UK GVCF 
market, shaping policy and program design. This is manifest in 
all four cleantech GVCFs being private co-financed and private 
led – to make use of VC fund manager antecedent learned skills 
for selection, market knowledge and networking and non-
financial portfolio business development support skills [43] – 
supporting Lerner’s [44] principles. Policymakers have 
considered market roles, avoiding duplication and crowding out 
[77] and they have acknowledged the dynamics of the finance 
escalator [27] by undertaking regular GVCF monitoring and 
market evaluations.  
However, there remains a concerning lack of antecedent 
learning in UK government department and agency teams, 
particularly where VC policy is nascent (IUK), or in hiatus 
(BEIS). This is exacerbated by staff turnover and the exodus of 
experienced senior GVCF policy staff to the BBB from 2013. 
This is manifested in repeated mistakes, which fail to take heed 
of the NAO (2009) [74] report’s criticisms of small-scale poorly 
designed regional funds and dangers of niche thin market sector 
funds [67], with insufficient account for new venture pipelines, 
follow-on funding and exits [28]. In this respect, UKIIF’s large 
scale and international design represents the zenith of BEIS 
GVCF knowledge, prior to establishment of BBB. Conversely, 
the ERDF funded LCIF is small-scale, regional, sector 
constrained, with additional EU social policy targets. LCIF’s 
program managers noted “…hard lessons were learned in order 
to adjust the fund” but with regular monitoring (advocated by 
Lerner [44], Owen et al, [1]), these were successfully made.  
Concerns remain that the UK seat of GVCF learning is the 
BBB, yet this specialist SME finance agency has “no remit to 




agencies that do so. BBB exhibits path dependency [35], 
focusing on delivering private funding leverage and financial 
return rather than low carbon. Meanwhile, BEIS, IUK and 
DEFRA policymakers “…take consultants advice…” and are 
typically “…unaware of prior GVCF program evaluations.” 
The problem with consultancy reporting is the level of path 
dependency [35], undermining seeking and interpreting market 
information to support a policy vision, which may be poorly 
conceived.           
Realized learning [34], provides policy and operational 
advancement. This study offers key examples where program 
monitoring and evaluation has led to adjustments. This is most 
notable in the LCIF’s wider sectoral remit, but also in IA’s 
adjustments to offer more substantial follow-on funding and 
develop wider reach by contracting with regional business 
angel syndicates. Perhaps one of the most important advances 
has been made by LCIF, which when established had no defined 
low carbon selection criteria. The program managers 
recognized this shortcoming and designed a sophisticated set of 
metrics which pre-empted later EU green deal requirements for 
the second funding round. Arguably, LCIF has raised the bar 
for other specialist cleantechs, since UKIIF required only a low 
carbon mission, with no subsequent impact assessment. LCIF’s 
program managers also recognize “developing portfolio 
company environmental impact, alongside innovation and 
financial metrics, has improved our monitoring and portfolio 
venture follow-on funding.” 
Another learning realization route follows Lerner’s [44] 
principle of attracting experienced fund managers. CGF 
contracted CLT, a specialist cleantech incubator, early-stage 
investor. CLT have established the most comprehensive 
portfolio venture selection and impact monitoring in the UK. 
CGF’s fund manager and BEIS policymakers explained 
“…comprehensive CO2 savings require innovation impact 
progress and supply-chain measures”. Circular economy 
impacts remain a potential learning aspect, although 
“…material inputs into production and processes and wider 
environmental planning impacts have been taken into account.” 
This demonstrates important progress for cleantech GVCF, but 
also shows how government’s socio-environmental policy 
concerns – including “…national energy security” – offer 
different priorities from the private sector [25].          
Potential learning [34] offers promise, but also concern. For 
example, the LCIF’s problems with recruiting portfolio 
companies were only partially alleviated by taking on a wider 
regional sector remit. A further solution was to invest earlier 
stage, to reduce large sums of matched private funding required 
in rounds, but this in turn created a shortfall of later Series A 
funding. Delays in obtaining more fund investment, alongside 
retention of the round syndication private investment leverage 
model, may have potentially negative repercussions for 
portfolio companies, not yet fully understood.  
 
X.  DISCUSSION: DEVELOPING SYSTEMS AND LEARNING FOR 
GVCF 
           
This paper addresses a pertinent question facing government 
policymakers; how best to support VC to achieve Climate 
Change objectives? Literature review established the persistent 
patient capital finance gap facing early-stage cleantech 
innovation [29], [1], [2], and potential role for GVCFs to 
address this [2], [51], [25]. Finding UK cleantech GVCFs are 
nascent and evolving, a qualitative, grounded case [39] research 
approach was undertaken, analyzing supply-side policy, GVCF 
program design and implementation. Focusing on four main 
UK cleantech GVCFs, established since 2009, the paper offers 
contemporary insights for GVCF policymakers and a novel 
contribution to evaluation theory in adopting a holistic entfin 
ecosystem framework [8], [80], [81] and an absorptive capacity 
learning lens [34], [35].    
From an evaluation theory perspective, the paper avoids using 
quantitative data which is inappropriate for interim cleantech 
GVCF evaluation, given multiple issues with measuring long 
horizon investment exit outcomes, skewing from late exit stellar 
outliers [21] and the need to consider the wider socio-economic 
remit of GVCFs [62], [26], [30]. VC development is a long 
game, likely to take decades [26], and few UK cleantech GVCF 
exits have been recorded, indicating that R&D progression 
alongside improved socio-environmental measures are better 
interim evaluation guides [38]. Thus, cleantech GVCF is likely 
to increase its presence, rather than withdraw from the market 
in the next decade. The adopted systems and learning model 
offers coherent insights into policy learning and program 
design. For example, from a policy systems perspective, the 
different and evolving roles of the GVCFs can be traced, 
demonstrating their antecedent learning in respective ToC [41] 
to adopt de-risking co-financing demonstration models to 
encourage, upskill and develop sustainable private cleantech 
VC [44], [24], [20] and in niche positioning of GVCFs within 
the early-stage finance escalator to crowd-in private finance 
[27], [77]. CGF’s recruitment of leading UK seed investment 
fund managers overcame BEIS departmental policy 
deficiencies, translating antecedent learning into new realized 
learning in developing a market leading holistic cleantech 
selection and evaluation approach (accounting for material 
inputs, site planning, innovation and supply-chain impacts), 
which (although not fully cognizant of circular economic 
factors) other GVCFs should benefit from [38]. 
The dynamic longitudinal systems and learning model further 
enhances policy evaluation by demonstrating the contribution 
of the cleantech GVCF within the entfin ecosystem and, 
crucially, the dynamics that create this. In this respect the 
inherent problems of the logic model implementation for LCIF 
and IA and their subsequent program design adjustments are 
instructive. Arguably, LCIF demonstrated path dependency 
[35] failings, not heeding warnings [24], [74], in establishing an 
evergreen small-scale regional cleantech seed fund, believing 
that local universities, R&D and science park facilities would 
provide a sufficient pipeline of ventures to meet cleantech and 
women’s enterprise development objectives. Regular 
monitoring flagged thin market issues [76], leading to realized 
learning [34] design adjustments, but these subsequently led to 
a shortfall in Series A follow-on funding. A finding here is that 
matching funding in rounds (rather than in funds themselves) is 
problematic [51], [48]. Whilst this latter issue remains a 
potential learning point for LCIF, it was already an antecedent 
learning of IUK which designed preferred supplier seed VC into 




grant schemes to assess portfolio technology readiness level 
progression towards commercialization and wider innovation 
cluster evaluation impact in IA’s long horizon investments. 
However, IA also fell into the path dependent trap of lack of 
fund size to address follow-on funding, alongside insufficient 
entfin network linkages across UK regions. Both matters were 
flagged in early evaluation and delivered realized learning 
through fund enlargement and connectivity with regional angel 
investor networks.    
From a policy perspective a key, systems and learning, 
finding is the lack of UK policy coherency for cleantech 
GVCFs. Under the UK Green Finance Strategy (2019) the 
focus, as with the former UK Green Investment Bank prior to 
privatization in 2017, is for green growth and leveraging private 
sector investment into large-scale infrastructure investments. 
Little attention is applied to coordinating early-stage cleantech 
innovation finance or ensuring that BBB GVCF programs have 
low carbon consideration alongside their aims to generate 
investment returns for the Treasury. Furthermore, UK GVCF 
design and implementation has been almost the sole domain of 
the BBB since 2013, it embodies Government’s GVCF 
organizational learning [40], but is only responsible for one 
cleantech GVCF. Whilst UKIIF’s design and operation 
represents the zenith of recent UK cleantech design, 
demonstrating antecedent learning in relation to fund size [44], 
private investment leverage, overcoming thin markets via 
transnational investment and offering global market 
syndication [51] and multi-stage follow-on funding through to 
scale-up and exit [57], UKIIF’s funds are fully invested. The 
new emerging cleantech GVCFs are being developed by IUK 
(IA) and BEIS (CGF) and their respective policy teams do not 
have antecedent knowledge of GVCF design. The evidence 
suggests that policy knowledge and learning is limited in these 
departments, advised by consultants, and in one case a 
secondment from the private sector, with little cross-
departmental learning. This lack of cohesion extends to patchy 
interconnection between specialist venture support policy such 
as through IUK’s Catapult innovation support centres and BEIS 
local Growth Hub initiatives, which could assist with 
investment readiness and delivering improved venture pipelines 
[82], [48]. Finally, entfin systems policy requires a more 
supportive tax and regulatory environment that encourages UK 
cleantech ventures to flourish in difficult to penetrate long 
horizon sectors (e.g. construction, engineering) and encourages 
early-stage long horizon investing through improved carbon 
accounting and public awareness [38], [3], [4].     
XI. CONCLUSION 
The development of a systems and learning model for 
assessing the four main UK cleantech GVCFs’ policy system, 
program design and implementation, provides important 
contemporary lessons on current good practice. The 
longitudinal approach also captures the dynamics of learning 
operating through key actor interactions, regular monitoring 
and evaluation that underpin hybrid GVCF development. 
Given the nascent, emergent status of cleantech GVCFs, this 
qualitative process focused analysis appears most appropriate 
for disseminating good practice within the UK and also 
globally, where cleantech GVCF are also emerging. In this 
way the paper addresses how best government should develop 
GVCFs to support cleantech commercialization for low carbon 
impacts.  
However, more is required. The study highlights a lack of 
strategic government oversight in relation to enhancing 
organizational learning [40] to develop GVCF within the 
wider entfin ecosystem [96], [21]. This requires policymaker 
and policy connectivity and interorganizational and 
international learning [25]. 
The limitations of the study are highlighted by policy silos 
and lack of transparent public reporting on GVCFs and 
limitations in the use of appropriate indicators to properly 
assess their financial and public good roles within the wider 
entfin ecosystem [38]. Furthermore, publishing constraints 
permit only a supply-side focus, rather than a close 
examination of the progression and performance of the funded 
cleantech ventures. Thus, whilst this paper provides a research 
framework, overcoming these limitations remain the 
challenges for future research.       
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Table 3: GVCF Systems and Learning Approach for Cleantech: A Developing UK Model 
Theme/GVCF Investment Accelerator (IA; 2017) 
National Seed Fund 
Clean Growth Fund (CGF; 
2020) National Series A Fund 
UKIIF (2009) International 
Series A/Scale-up Fund 
LCIF (2009) Regional 
Seed/Series A Fund 
GVCF Policy System 
ToC/Logic 
model 
Increase seed investment, raise VC 
and angels seed investing skills, 
market demonstrator, certificating 
cleantech and health PHG 
advancement through TRLs for 
follow-on investment. Offering seed 
grants of up to £100k matched with 
up to £50k seed VC. 
Series A cleantech gap 
funding, UK-wide. Offering 
investment of between £250k 
to £2m (with no requirement 
for additional deal syndication 
finance). Delivers VC funding 
to commercialise BEIS energy 
entrepreneur grants. 
Series A and scale-up low 
carbon long horizon gap 
funding, UK and global. VC 
upskilling and demonstration. 
Offering investment typically 
between £500k to £5m (no 
additional syndication required). 
Seed to Series A cleantech 
gap funding, East of England 
Region. Offering £25k to 
£1m with minimum 50% 
matching private syndication 
funding required). Addresses 
ERDF aims assisting women 
entrepreneurs, jobs, skills.  
Fund legal 
status 
IUK grants matching private LP VC's 
or angel syndicates  
10-years private LP VC Extended 12-15 years private 
LP VC 





IUK support, catapult/catalyst  BEIS clean energy policy, 
business regulatory support 
BBB/EIF funding suite  Regional LEP, IUK 
catalyst/catapult 
GVCF Programme Design 
Private Sector Role 
Private FM 
Lead 
Private VC/angel network preferred 
supplier led: initial grant peer review, 
VCs FMs select investments (<£50k 
not requiring selection committee)  
Single specialist private VC-
led: FM selection committee 
Private umbrella and underlying 
funds: FM selection committee 






Two-thirds IUK innovation grant 
match, certificated by grant peer 
review – no syndication leverage 
requirement 
At least 50% match to £20m 
BEIS clean energy innovation 
funding – no round funding 
leverage requirement 
Pari passu top up to close 
European cleantech/health VC 
– no round funding leverage 
requirement  
Pari passu ERDF funded, 
requiring at least 50% 
private match funding – no 
in-fund matching required 
FM skills 
development 
Encouraging seed stage investing 
experience in earlier stages and new 
low carbon/health sectors  
Developing Series A cleantech 
experience in the energy 
sector, offering market 
demonstration 
Encouraging experienced 
European VC in venture/scale-
up into new markets with 
umbrella fund support 
Developing early stage 
cleantech investing, across 
sectors with LC credentials – 
developed selection LC 
impact indicators 
Fund Size 
Fund Size £75m over 3+ years of funding rounds £40m+ (planned for upwards 
of £100m over time) 
£330m (average underlying 
fund £60m) 
£31m in 2 tranches (tranche 
1: £20.5m, 2009-2019) 
Target 
Markets 
UK cleantech infrastructure and 
health seed investing 
UK Series A cleantech UK (>= UK govt £150m 
investment) and global 
cleantech and health venture 
and scale-up  




Potential larger, later stage grant 
matches 
Expectation of further private 
fundraising 
Large underlying funds with 
follow on investing capacity 
Limited funds for follow-on, 
second ERDF tranche 2019 
Fund Structure and Finance System Linkages 
Structure Funds private LP VCs and angel 
network syndicates  
Single 10-years LP private-led 
GVCF 
Fund of Funds, extended 12-






Matches grants with VC and angel 
equity 
Links with BEIS Energy 
Entrepreneurs Fund grants 
European/global VC networking Regional university 




Early and interim evaluation (2018-
2020, unpublished) 
Planning early (2021) and 
interim evaluation 
Early (2012) and interim 
evaluation (2017, unpublished) 
Final (single) first fund 
evaluation (2015) 
Dynamic Learning  
Antecedent 
Learning 
Early, regular monitoring/evaluation 
Planned syndicate co-financing 
Private VC-led 
Progression, follow-on fund oriented 
VC, early investor upskilling 
Early, regular 
monitoring/evaluation 
Co-financed in fund 
Private VC-led 
10-years LP 
Planned large size, fund to exit 
oriented 
Enviro selection criteria 
Early, regular 
monitoring/evaluation 
Co-financed in funds 
Private VC led 
12-15 years LP for long horizon 
Large size funds to follow-on 
and syndicate to exit 
VC upskilling 
Regular monitoring, fund 
evaluation 
Private investor led 
Cleantech pipeline-linked 




High additionality (>80%), FM 
learning from interaction with portfolio 
and market demonstration. Desire for 
greater regional coverage led to 
including/supporting regional angel 
networks.  
Pre evaluation stakeholder, 
logic model. Private VC 
improved selection criteria 
focus on environmental 
impact, including circular 
economy and supply-chains 
Private-led Fund of Funds, high 
management fees, difficult to 
monitor. High VC/institutional 
underlying fund private 
investment leverage, but only 
moderate venture financing 
additionality.   
Regional venture pipeline 
considerations insufficient to 
meet socio-enviro goals. 
Cleantech definition and 





Enabled earlier stage VC funding, but 
too small to achieve follow-on, 
program extended by £25m to fund 
follow-on. Potential to improve path 
dependent grant peer review. 
Too early to report. Enabled earlier fund close, 
larger size funds. Upskilled 
FMs, increased syndication, 
foreign market penetration, 
follow-on and exits. Path 
Evergreen fund not self- 
supporting at 10 years. 
Obtained second fund for 
follow-on and new 
investments into wider range 
dependent re no enviro impact 
measures.  
of sectors, retaining enviro 
goals. 
Sources: BIS (2012) Early assessment of UKIIF; IAP early assessment (unpublished, see Owen et al, 2020); LCIF (2015) Final evaluation; interviews with fund 
managers (FMs) and policymakers at BEIS, BBB and IUK for all programmes 
